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The 1 07th ''Timber Wolf''
Battalion at Hill 70
Steven A. Bell

Editor's Note: With this issue CMHbegins a series on little-known

Canadian military units. We invite future contributions.
his is an account of the achievements of a
few hundred Canadians, on a battlefield far
T
away, almost 80 years ago. I have the feeling it is
not a very well known story. Those I have spoken
to and what I have read leads me to believe that
very few Canadians could either
recall the name of this unit or
on a map place this field of
honour. In truth, I have not
found a great deal of
information about this Great
War Battalion and, except for
Canadian texts, the battle itself
seems to have escaped the
attention of many historians. Yet
I felt drawn to these ghosts and
their deeds and am determined
to ensure they are not forgotten.
The 107th Battalion was raised in Winnipeg,
Manitoba, in November 1915. Its first
Commanding Officer was Lieutenant-Colonel Glen
Campbell, a veteran of the North-West Rebellion,
where he served as a member of Boulton's Scouts
and received a field commission to the rank of
Captain. 1 Campbell had been the Chieflnspector
of the Agencies of the Department oflndian Affairs
at Winnipeg and he spoke several native
languages. 2 The motivation and politics of the
recruiting drive that produced the battalion are
beyond the scope of this work, but the result was
a unit where over 500 of the original 900 soldiers
were Native Canadians. Represented in the ranks
were the Cree, Sioux, Mohawks, Onandagas,
Oniedas, Tuscaroras, Delawares and Ojibwas.
Many of these soldiers spoke little, if any, English.
Campbell was known to have conducted parades

and administrative and discipline matters in
native languages, likely a dialect of Cree or
Ojibwa. 3 The battalion would continue to evolve
as a native unit. On its arrival in France, the
records reflect large transfers of men out to other
units, and at the same time,
smaller transfers in. This
exchange was the result of a
general order inviting units of
the Canadian Corps to transfer
natives (and "Half Breeds" as
one unit responded) to the
107th. 4 In other ways the
Battalion seems to have been a
typical Canadian unit of the
Great War, that is to say a
curious mix of the old and the
new. While its Pipe and Drum
Band reflected its Imperial
linkages (and likely Campbell's heritage), its Wolf
cap badge seems to reflect an ancient native
influence, yet its training and role was indicative
of the emerging technology of war. 5
The 107th was initially an infantry unit, but
was re-designated while in England and arrived
in France configured as a Pioneer Battalion.
Pioneers are infantry soldiers trained to conduct
basic combat engineering tasks (usually
associated with the preparing of defenses or the
breaching of obstacles) in the very front line. 6
Pioneers were not support troops, like the
Entrenching Battalions or Railway Companies
(unarmed units assigned specific tasks in the rear
areas) nor pure engineers like the Engineering
Field Companies (professional engineers capable
of sophisticated design and construction in the
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Canadian troops advance along a trench on the
outskirts of Lens.
(NACJ

one remembers that unlike the other diversions
(and in fact the main initiatives) the Canadian
operations were stunning successes and
significant defeats for the German Army. At any
rate a series of limited objective operations were
conducted by the British First Army in the spring
and summer of 1917. The attack on Hill 70 was
one of these actions.

j;

battle area) but were fighting troops. They were
armed, trained (the 107th's records reflect a
significant amount of bayonet training) and
employed in combat roles, when not assigned
engineering tasks. The l 07th held a section of
the frontline from late June until mid-July 1917,
running the same trench warfare house keeping
and fighting routines as any other infantry unit,
while at the same time providing large semiskilled work parties to conduct engineering
battlefield preparation works. 7
In the summer of 191 7, the Canadian Corps,
as part of the British First Army, was located in
llie Arras Sector of the Western Front. Fresh from
its important victory at Vimy Ridge, the Corps
was confident and in relatively good condition.
The strategic imperative of the day involved the
clearing of the Belgian Coast to provide Britain
warning and defense from a new horror of modem
war, the aerial bombardment of civilian targets.
Field Marshal Douglas Haig intended that while
the main effort would occur on the Ypres front,
other fronts would advance the policy of attrition
by means of local surprise attacks.B Desmond
Morton insists that both Vimy Ridge and Hill 70
were diversionary battles for other British and
French operations. 9 1nis might seem a somewhat
sour footnote to these stories of courage unless

This action was originally to have involved a
frontal assault on the town of Lens. This was not
allowed to happen. The Canadian Corps received
a new Commander in June 1917, LieutenantGeneral Arthur Currie, a militia soldier from
British Columbia. General Currie had been a very
successful Divisional Commander who had
started to solidify what was to be known as the
Canadian approach to war - the expending of
firepower and material, not human lives, to win
objectives. 1° Currie rejected the First Army plan
to attack the town. A direct assault into the
fortified ruins of an urban area would favour the
defender and likely cost the Canadians horrific
casualties without significantly challenging
German resources as his mission required him
to do. Rather, Currie selected the high ground
around the shattered town of Lens as his
objective. The occupation of the elevated positions
(overlooking the city) with another "Vimy" type
assault would threaten the entire German
defensive position in the sector. The German
reaction would likely be to counterattack
consuming valuable men and material, thus
advancing First Army's strategic mission. This
decision reflects the sophistication of Currie's
leadership and expertise in both the interpretation
of strategy and in the science of modern warfare.
In late June 1917. he assigned Hill 70 as the
immediate target of the Canadian lst and 2nd
Infantry Divisions and withdrew them to train and
rest for the coming operation. 11
Currie devised an innovative battle plan which
depended largely on the new technologies and
skills of the Canadian Corps and built on the
experience gained at Vimy and elsewhere. He
planned to quickly occupy the high ground in a
whirlwind attack, establish defensive positions
(studded with platoon-sized machine-gun
equipped strong points) and destroy. with a

74

https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol5/iss1/10

2

Chalk Pit

Bell: The 107th “Timber Wolf” Battalion at Hill 70

Wood

vJ
......

Hill 70

p..

n

~I"
<;:-.
~,......

500

a

--

0

500

1000
I

~

combined arms curtain of fire, the German forces,
who he knew would counterattack. Hill 70 was
to be "a killing by artillery" and would be the first
time radio communications with ground spotters
was employed as well as aerial observers
(operating from forward landing strips) to provide
deep observation and targeting for the Division
and Corps guns. 12
The plan called for the two divisions to attack
on a front of 4,000 yards. First Division was on
the left with two brigades forward. First Division's
3rd Brigade. with the 15th, 13th, and 16th
Infantry Battalions, would attack north of Hill 70
while 2nd Brigade. with the 1Oth and 5th Infantry
Battalions, would attack toward the summit
itself. 1:3 The objectives were the main enemy
defensive positions on the eastern or reverse slope
of the feature. designated as the Green, Red and
Blue lines. The supporting units included
hundreds of guns ( 102 field guns from each
division and 164 other heavy guns), smoke
screens. aerial support and, of course, engineering
support. The 107th Pioneer Battalion was in
direct support of the 3rd Infantry Brigade of 1st
Division.

*****

he assault went in at 0425 hours on 15
August. The forward positions of the 26th
and 165th Regiments of the German 7th Division
were overwhelmed by the dynamic. violent and
well practiced battle skills of the Canadian
infantry. 14 Following the assault troops across the
300 to 500 yards of deadly no-man's-land were
elements of the 107th. Their mission was to dig,
while under fire, "communication trenches"
linking the Canadian front lines with the newlycaptured enemy front lines. These zig-zag
constructions were vital to the safe movement
forward of the men and material needed to secure
the captured ground and implement Currie's plan
to inflict a bloody repulse of the inevitable
counterattacks. 15

T

It is useful to remember that pioneers were
really infantry soldiers - trained, armed and
equipped for close combat. Each pioneer carried
a personal load of ammunition, food, water and
weapons often totalling 60 to 80 pounds. As a
pioneer company each group's standard load
would have also included: 27 spools of barbed
wire; 200 sand bags; 100 shovels/picks/axes: 12
large wire cutters; and an ammunition stock of
6,000 rounds (mostly for their Lewis Guns) as
well as 100 grenades. 16 The 107th went forward
with orders to support the "straight" infantry with
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engineering tasks but could have been retasked
to join in an assault and were expected to defend
themselves on the active battlefield. No other
Canadian soldiers were expected to carry such
physical burdens or to have such operational
flexibility.
The battalions of the 3rd Brigade reached
their objectives by about 0600 hours and were
ready to destroy(with the help of massed artillery
fire) the expected counterattacks. The three
companies of the 107th spent that entire first day
dangerously exposed in no-man's-land, working
on the communication trenches. The cost was
high. The three companies lost 21 dead and 130
badly wounded of the 600 men engaged. One,
Private Anderson, a Cree from Saskatchewan,
won the Military Medal for his coolness under
fire.
The 107th continued its trenching tasks
throughout the first night. "D" Company actually
dug all the way from the start line to the Blue
Line, a distance of about 600 yards. 17 Late on the
night of the 16th the troops of the 107th also
carried forward construction stores to the most
advanced positions. While the infantry continued
to defend their new positions on the 17th, the
1 07th continued its tasks under fire and a new

threat, blister gas. Finally, on the night of 17 I 18
August, the 107th was ordered to the rear to rest.
The other units of the 3rd Brigade had already
been replaced during the previous night.
It was at this point thai an element of the
l07th took on another task. not one of combat
but rather one of rescue. One Company of the
l07th volunteered to stay behind and search for
wounded in the harder hit sector to the south,
particularly in the area of the lOth Battalion.
Campbell gave his permission and during the
night many wounded were rescued and about 30
dead buried. Unfortunately, the Germans detected
the activity and launched a gas attack that
poisoned 88 members ofthe l07th Battalion. 18

The larger battle in the Lens Sector continued
until 25 August. Many bitter and costly attacks
and several equally heroic counterattacks would
drive the casualty rates up on both sides. The
fighting ended when all of the geographical
objectives, but one, were in Canadian hands and
material shortages at the Army level precluded
further operations.
The battle for Hill 70 met its strategic aim in
that it tied down German men and resources that
might have been used elsewhere. Currie's forces

The rugged terrain of the battlefield is evident from this view oj the
Chalk Quarry on the reverse slope qf Hill 70.

(NAC)
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Canadian soldiers rest in the Gennan trenches on Hill 70 following the battle.
(NAC PA 1717)

"badly mauled five German Divisions" inflicting
twice as many casualties as he sustained. 19 This
action provided a sound base on which to
continue building the Corps' collective expertise.
The l 07th, as part of the 3rd Infantry Brigade,
was very much a part of this success story. Its
efforts. and those of other units like it, would be
called force multipliers in today's military jargon.
In essence, the pioneers made the infantry more
effective by providing them with a secure lifeline
to their support area. The protection of the
communication trenches allowed an
uninterrupted two-way flow of people and
material. The l 07th was commended for their
efforts by General Currie. The official records also
contain a letter of appreciation from the
Commanding Officer of the lOth Infantry
Battalion thanking the men of the l07th for the
rescue of his wounded. 20

*****
ow the l07th was able to do this important
task is a difficult question. By 1917. the
Canadian Corps had solved may of the equipment
problems of earlier years. The experience of three
years of war had also brought forward changes
in operational and tactical concepts, an

H

atmosphere of innovation and development
existed within the Corps. But it takes more than
good equipment to dig a 600 yard zig-zag trench
under heavy artillery fire. It takes more than good
ideas to cause an exhausted Company to volunteer
to stay behind, exposed to enemy fire, to look for
casualties and bury the dead.
It came down to a matter of morale. In the
pitifully sparse War Diary there are scraps of
evidence to indicate that these were proud men
who thought well of themselves and their unit.
Almost every month, noted beside the casualty
lists and "Works Accomplished" records, are the
results of some battalion sporting achievement.
Often team sports, baseball and soccer, but also
individual efforts, particularly in long distance
running. Noteworthy by their absence is the
mention of discipline problems of any type; only
two Charge Parades were recorded in almost a
year of entries. This was indicative of a collective
spirit of well being within the unit. It was
maintained for a long period of time under some
of the most demanding conditions in the history
of man. Good morale is always the product of
good leadership applied over an extended period.
The quality of leadership within a fighting unit is
the product of the commanding officer's ability
to set the tone. Lieutenant-Colonel Campbell
77
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created and trained the 107th Battalion. To him
goes the credit for turning hundreds of individuals
from different nations and language groups into
an efficient and effective fighting team. It was
Campbell's understanding and regard for his
native soldiers that was at the heart of this
battalion and the key to their success in the hell
ofno-man's-land at Hill 70.

5.

The intensity and scope of the combat
engineering tasks which evolved during the first
part of World War I focused attention on the need
to re-think this arm of the service. By 1917, there
was a blurring of some of the tasks performed by
engineers/pioneers/infantry in the forward areas,
as well as a need to streamline the command and
control arrangements. 21 There was the hope that
the war would once more be one of manoeuvre.
With this hope came the realization that modern
mobility enhancing-missions on a grand scale
would require a intensification of the engineering
capabilities in the Canadian Corps. The solution,
was the expansion of the combat engineering arm
in each division into a brigade-sized formation.
This was accomplished by consolidating many
of the function-specific units including the
pioneers. 22 The 107th received this reorganization order on 26 March 1918. and the
reorganization took place on the 28th. The
soldiers of the battalion were distributed among
three new engineering battalions of the Canadian
1st Infantry Division. 2 :l The 107th as an entity
was overtaken by the technological demands of
the war.

7.

The Battle of Hill 70 was a Canadian victory
and the 107th Pioneers played a successful and
important role in this attack. This part of
Canada's military history and the Timber Wolf
Battalion should not be forgotten.
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My Grandfather was a rancher in the Canadian West
during the Great War. Four of the Native Canadians who
worked for him joined the 107th. Only one returned. he
gave my family a 107th cap badge. He claimed U1e Timber
Wolf was selected because it was a common totem to
many of the native soldiers. He used the name 'Timber
Wolf Battalion' to refer to the unit. No other explanation
regarding the origin of the cap badge was discovered in
the records held at the National Archives.
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